During the past two decades, these latter developments have given rise to a vast literature questioning not only the relationship between practice and research, but also the validity of "practice-based" contributions to knowledge. 6 Gradually, initial confusion has given way to efforts aimed at a methodological formalization of design inquiries undertaken in academic contexts. Here, some have considered the extent to which "experiential" factors can be seen to legitimately inform the research process and its outcomes. 7 Meanwhile, others have sought to reposition the tools of conventional research as directive aids for design-based knowledge production. Although many of these contributions offer viable conceptualizations of design practice as a method, discussions relating to the epistemological frameworks or concerns underpinning them have been relatively limited. In place of epistemology, scholars have tried at times to characterize design research as necessarily tacit. 9 In addition to this perspective, another maneuver positions the design research program as the "frame and foundation" of research that incorporates design practice. 10 The program is said to furnish activities with a core belief system, and with a set of theoretical commitments that link the work to deeper strands of philosophy.
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Such proposals undoubtedly hold appeal, but the general absence of an explicit, widely shared epistemological narrative dedicated to the incorporation of design practice in research is problematic. It points to evasion, suggesting that such an approach is not seen to require justification. The absence of such a narrative also limits the potential for development and is, ultimately, regrettable.
In seeking to address this gap, a number of epistemological pairings might be advanced. For example, plausible alignment could be drawn with Nigel Cross's theory of "designerly ways of knowing"-or with more general perspectives on design thinking. 12 However, given the popular focus on notions of the experimental, Donald Schön's concept of knowledge-in-practice arguably provides one of the clearest articulations of an epistemology of design inquiry yet published. 13 Above all, his positioning of reflection in and on action as a form of inquiry lends ready support to the view that design practice can be central to the conduct of research. Indeed, Schön is already widely referenced in design research literature concerned with exploring practice-research relationships.
14 This apparent alignment in turn points to another, deeper alignment-namely, to the connection between Schön and the pragmatist philosopher, John Dewey, whose theory of inquiry inspired the underlying structure of Schön's approach. 15 Although design scholars tend to pay relatively less attention to Dewey's work, his aesthetics and pedagogy have had a direct and profound influence on the broader field of design-an influence perhaps most immediately evident in the context of design education. Here, Dewey's connections with László Moholy-Nagy and with John Andrew Rice led to an involvement in the establishment of both the New Bauhaus in Chicago and Black Mountain College in North Carolina. 16 By the time the New Bauhaus became the Institute of Design, Dewey's Art as Experience (1934) the product design workshop. 17 The book's chapter, "Having an Experience," also informed the incorporation of design thinking in human-computer interaction (HCI) work at the Palo Alto Research Center and subsequently became a foundational text in the discipline. 18 This influence has continued until now, with Dewey's theories of experience still inspiring much discussion among the interaction design community.
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Despite the breadth of Dewey's influence on design in general, few authors have directly explored the implications of his broader philosophy for design research. 20 Most striking-especially in light of the wide referencing by Schön-is the minimal investigation of his epistemological approach.
I argue that Dewey offers a more expansive approach to knowledge than can be found in Schön-an approach that if carefully examined and appropriated might enrich design research. Accordingly, in the remainder of this article I aim to do two things: first provide an outline of Dewey's approach to knowledge, and second, highlight specific features that can strengthen the epistemological basis of design inquiry.
To avoid confusion, I first make a distinction between the concept of knowledge as it pertains to design research and knowledge in the context of individual acts of learning. The distinction is expressed in the difference between "it is known" and "I know." The latter points to a personal endeavor, while the former implies that a particular set of techniques and procedures-recognized by a specific knowledge community-have been applied, leading to outcomes that advance the investigations of that community. In highlighting Dewey's epistemological approach, I examine its applicability to the formal process of knowledge production in design research, rather than to the work of professionals operating solely in the domain of design practice.
John Dewey's Pragmatism
John Dewey's (1859-1952) work sits with that of Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), William James (1842-1910), and George Herbert Mead (1863-1931) in the classical pragmatist tradition, a movement that coalesces around a series of core concerns relating to knowledge, meaning, truth, and value. While classical pragmatism was gradually usurped by logical positivism in the late 1930s, numerous followers continued to pursue key pragmatist themes through the following decades of the twentieth century. 21 For example, Richard McKeon conducted investigations of rhetoric, in which Buchanan has found a wealth of connections relating to the study of design. 22 More recently, the neo-pragmatism of Richard Rorty and others has led to a resurgence of interest in classical pragmatist philosophy. 23 In broad terms, Dewey's own unique pragmatism can be seen to bridge Peirce's critical and scientific interests with James's concern for moral implications. 24 Dewey focuses almost continuously throughout his work on the relation between science and human value. Underpinned by what has been interpreted as a "melioristic spirit," his philosophy reveals a long-term commitment to the possibility of enabling a democratic reconstruction of the social world. 25 The readings of Dewey that follow are my own, and I have been guided by the work of two leading Dewey scholars: Ralph Sleeper and Larry Hickman. Both offer insightful perspectives on Dewey's work, describing its core features and highlighting its contemporary implications. Of the two, Sleeper develops the more compelling presentation. In his account, understanding Dewey in holistic terms requires understanding how his theory of inquiry relates to his metaphysics through a theory of communication.
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This basic thesis guides the structure of the following sections, where my primary focus is on two texts: Logic: A Theory of Inquiry (1938) and Experience and Nature (1925) . 27 The former presents what is perhaps Dewey's clearest statement on the subjects of inquiry and logic, while the latter might be understood as a background to this work, setting out Dewey's metaphysics.
It is important to note that Dewey's philosophy has not avoided criticism. In fact, an entire volume has been devoted to the various and sometimes high-profile attacks and critiques mounted by his contemporaries. 28 For the most part, these essays focus on aspects of Dewey's metaphysics, often questioning the extent to which it can be seen as a metaphysics at all or the particular version of reality it presents. 29 Another area of contention concerns his theory of inquiry and its relationship to formal logic. 30 More recently, Rorty-a champion of Dewey in general-has dismissed his metaphysics as a mistake. 31 Given the radical nature of many of Dewey's proposals, such criticisms are understandable. Approaching the work without prior orientation, some pronouncements can appear ill-conceived or misguided, leading to much confusion in the literature. However, slow, careful, and systematic readings of the works-which Dewey's admirers frequently urge-can be combined with reference to the full breadth of available sources to yield a rich and rewarding insight into human action and its potential.
Dewey's Theory of Inquiry
Although Dewey's theory of inquiry is unique, it directly appropriates several core concepts drawn from Charles Sanders Peirce's "doubt-belief" theory. 32 In this work, Peirce explored the role of human psychology in the evolutionary process. In his view, the human organism must continually move in cycles from a state of doubt to a state of belief to survive. When in doubt, we are "uneasy and dissatisfied" and, as a result, are required to initiate "a struggle to attain a state of belief"-a process that Peirce refers to as "inquiry." 33 Through his appropriation of Peirce, Dewey refashioned the original theory into an organic, naturalistic presentation of inquiry, allowing it to account for both the emergence of the scientific method, as well as formal logic. 34 On this reframing, logic would become empirical and observable, instead of being understood as "unobservable, transcendental, and 'intuitional.'" 35 Although both doubt and belief were retained as the theory's start and end points, knowledge was now positioned as inquiry's "product." 36 In offering a definition of inquiry, Dewey provides the following statement:
Inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one which is so determinate in its constitute distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the original situation into a unified whole.
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Dewey proposed that, in all cases, the process followed a more or less coherent sequence, referred to as the "pattern of inquiry." For Dewey, this process begins when we alight upon a questionable situation. Such a situation might be "troubled, ambiguous, confused, full of conflicting tendencies, obscure," and so on. Dewey stressed that these traits belong to the situation and not to the individual or group initiating the inquiry.
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Questioning directs us toward a wider set of considerations. Perhaps most significant among them is the need to "institute" a clearly defined problem. According to Dewey, this problem frames the inquiry and becomes "the criterion" from which the "relevancy and irrelevancy of hypotheses and conceptual structures" are to be judged. From here, solutions might be conceived and evaluated. However, progress toward a solution presents a number of challenges.
In outlining the process, Dewey binds together a series of interrelated intellectual and practical activities that lead eventually to the close of inquiry. As an initial step, we must first attend to the immediate existential facts of the situation to identify a valid problem. Against these facts, solutions might "flash upon us, occur to us," in the form of suggestions or possibilities, which then evolve into ideas as we examine their "functional fitness" and their "capacity as a means of resolving the given situation." Here, they become "anticipated consequences (forecasts) of what will happen when certain operations are executed under and with respect to observed conditions."
39 After an idea is formed, its "meaning contents" must be considered in relation to the inquiry as a whole.
According to Dewey, this link occurs through a process of reasoning, wherein the consequences of selecting a given meaning are checked against its influence on the system of meanings that have been developed in the course of the inquiry. This checking is likely to result in an idea's modification as it is transformed through gradual iteration, becoming "more clearly relevant to the problem at hand." 40 Underpinning these stages of the process is Dewey's belief that inquiry is carried forward and ultimately brought to a close through the constant operational interaction of facts (i.e., existential material) with ideas (i.e., non-existential material). Facts lead to ideas; ideas lead to experiments or other "operations of observation," wherein further facts are gathered. 41 The iterative cycle relies on the productive interplay of both of these strands.
Interestingly, apart from the stipulation that indeterminate situations must become increasingly determinate, Dewey does not offer a clear insight into the endpoint or closure of inquiry-possibly because he insisted that no inquiry is final in and of itself. Indeed, he argues that no set of conclusions can avoid the possibility of future revision or adaption. Thus, rather than define the process of closure, Dewey invokes the concept of attaining knowledge as the means by which inquiry is settled:
That which satisfactorily terminates inquiry is, by definition, knowledge; it is knowledge because it is the appropriate close of inquiry.
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Use of the words "satisfactorily" and "appropriate" here imply that, at the end of an inquiry, a pre-existing set of aims or objectives will have been fulfilled, or at least approached, resulting in "an object of knowledge"-that is, a known object that might guide and inform further inquiry. Sensibly, against this latter stance, Dewey avoids any discussion of "truth" as a strictly defined concept relating to a correspondence with reality. Indeed, the possibility of final and absolute access to truth would inevitably conflict with an understanding of inquiry as a "continuing process." Instead, the notion of "warranted assertability" is introduced. Sleeper suggests the term is less precise than truth 43 ; nevertheless, warranted assertability does offer a flexible approach to the concept of validity in the conduct of inquiry. Specifically, it refers to the presentation of a set of reasonable conclusions that arise out of competent practice and that hold clear applicability to the conduct of future inquiries. 44 As such, warranted assertability recognizes the value of a claim while also allowing for future revision. Dewey thus focuses on the activities that direct inquiry rather than on its abstract underpinnings. As Morgenbesser states, Dewey saw inquiry as a "species of action" and not a purely intellectual pursuit. 45 Further, on the Deweyan understanding, inquiry is firmly located in ordinary life. Indeed, Dewey claimed that his pattern of inquiry was as applicable to everyday, "commonsense" inquiries as it was to scientific endeavor. In fact, he links the two: Commonsense inquiry attends to issues of "use and enjoyment" in holistic, real-world situations and science aims to abstract from these issues, resulting in contingent knowledge. When returned to everyday experience, this contingent knowledge is said to refine, expand, and liberate the "contents of and the agencies at the disposal of common sense." 46 Consequently, although everyday common sense and science differ in the types of problems they examine, they are not viewed as metaphysically or ontologically different. 47 This linking of common sense and science relies to a large degree on Dewey's proposal that two broad, "existential" matrices-one biological and the other cultural-necessarily frame and advance inquiry. Biologically, the human organism is considered in strictly functional terms, relating to our sensory, motor, and nervous systems. 48 From a cultural perspective, the relevant social factors come into focus, and here Dewey places a particular emphasis on language and its consequences-which leads to his theory of communication.
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Dewey's Theory of Communication
For Dewey, human communication is manifest not only in speech and writing but also, and more expansively, in all modes of art and music. 50 Accounts detailing the process of communication and its consequences appear throughout his works, with perhaps the sharpest outline provided as the central hinge of Experience and Nature. In this text Dewey challenges traditional conceptions of the relationship between the "external" world and the human mind. On his reconfiguration, communication-or more specifically, language-is presented as a "naturalistic link" between the physical world and the "ideal."
51 Indeed, for Dewey, the material-intellectual interactions that occur in language have led to all conceptions of the ideal or spiritual to begin with.
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Dewey's argument advances from the view that communication can be understood as "consummatory as well as instrumental."
53 It is consummatory because our immediate experiences are enhanced as we enjoy the consequences of exchange and understanding; and it is instrumental because we can establish cooperation for a joint activity through communication and language. 54 We then can gradually develop shared meanings concerning the foreseen consequences of the activities we undertake in partnership. The development of such shared meanings amounts to a gradual consolidation of the relationships between persons, things, and consequences. Over time, "pronounced instances of meaning" can be formed, which in turn constitute the "essence" of particular relationships within given cultures, says Dewey. 55 Although Dewey sees this process of consolidating meaning as one of the primary long-term outcomes of communication, he also says that such meanings are not applied restrictively. Rather, humans continually experiment with, stretch, and test them to determine whether they can be profitably transferred to any novel cases we encounter. 56 Such testing forms the basis of new thinking: Meaning, fixed as essence in a term of discourse, may be imaginatively administered and manipulated, experimented with. Just as we overtly manipulate things, making new separations and combinations, thereby introducing things into new contexts and environments…. 57 For Sleeper, such statements indicate Dewey's understanding of communication as transformational. 58 Dewey's argument suggests that communication might be seen as a process through which our conceptualizations of the relationships between persons, things, and consequences might be altered and redirected. Sleeper goes on to suggest that, in light of the Deweyan approach, the way we view existence itself can be seen as undergoing continual transformation through communication. This move links us at last to Dewey's own particular brand of metaphysics.
Dewey's Metaphysics
Metaphysics traditionally has been presented as the study of what exists, examining in particular the properties of existent things, their relationships, and the structure of reality as a whole. Although many metaphysical conclusions are at least partly based on direct empirical evidence, "hunches and intuitions of truth" also are permissible when "secure knowledge is unavailable."
59 From the beginning of the twentieth century, Dewey had questioned the extent to which this classical framing could be sustained. 60 In Experience and Nature, he proposed a full-scale reconstruction of the discipline.
The text opens with the argument that experience and nature should not be seen as separate. Experience, we are told, is "of nature as well as in nature."
61 Through experience, we encounter a world that is anything but "sure, regular, and finished." Rather, the world we come to know in daily life is a blend of "sufficiencies, tight completeness, order, [and] recurrences," as well as "singularities, ambiguities, [and] In light of this complexity, Dewey describes existence as consisting of events. 63 Events draw together human life in an unbounded completeness, weaving the personal, the social, and the material into one complex interaction. As his theory of communication highlights, Dewey believes that social discourse enables us to identify and articulate the meaning of things-to draw them into focus, as well as to expand upon them. Further, in events, language allows us to convert felt qualities into the "objective differences" between things. Feelings come to make sense. We can identify and discriminate between "pains, pleasures, odors, colors, noises, tones." 64 Because such qualities arise through "the complex and extensive interaction of events," Dewey insists that they must be understood as holding a "natural existential status": They belong as much to the situation as to the individual. 65 In holding a natural existential status, these qualities are presented as the "ends, terminals, arrests, enclosures" of nature. Thus, nature becomes "an affair of affairs"-a linked up set of ends and beginnings that each hold felt qualities. 66 The text concludes with an exploration of the relationships between existence, values, and philosophy. Dewey states that "natural ends" necessarily present intrinsic, immediately recognizable values. Appropriately contextualized, then, philosophy would become "a method of discriminating among goods on the basis of the conditions of their appearance and of their consequences"-that is, a method of criticism, or "a criticism of criticisms." 67 This method, when properly pursued as a means of inquiry, would result in the institution and perpetuation of "more enduring and extensive values." 68 From Dewey's outline of existence and this proposed redirection of philosophy, a reconstructed metaphysics would aim toward "a statement of the generic traits manifested by existences of all kinds without regard to their differentiation between the physical and the mental," says Dewey. These traits would likely include "qualitative individuality and constant relations, contingency and need, movement and arrest." Although the identification of such traits would never be final, they would begin to provide philosophy with a "ground map," guiding criticism toward "more intricate triangulations" in its investigation of values. 69 
A Deweyan Framework for Knowledge
Dewey never developed a formal epistemological theory in the traditional sense. 70 However, some scholars suggest that his theory of inquiry functions as a stand-in, thus fulfilling a similar role. 71 Although this observation is partly true, Sleeper presents a compelling argument for seeing Dewey's approach to knowledge as being distributed across the three theories outlined (i.e., inquiry, communication, and metaphysics).
Sleeper centralizes Dewey's theory of inquiry and highlights how, as an approach to understanding logic, it takes experience as its subject matter. Following John McDermot, he argues that Dewey's perspective of experience is to be understood as "pedagogical": It teaches, and through reflection, we learn. 72 By reflecting on our experiences in experimental settings that include both common sense inquiry and scientific inquiry, we can arrive at objects of knowledge-at known objects. This transformation is key, for when unknown objects become known objects, we inevitably transform our understanding of their placement in the world, which consequently is itself transformed. As Sleeper states:
The thing is not merely seen differently as a result of inquiry, nor is the difference merely the effect of causal factors present in the operations of inquiry, which intervene between the non-cognitive object and the object as known. For the object, by being placed in wholly new relationships, becomes a different object. The transaction that takes place in inquiry reconstructs the object by reconstructing its relations.
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For Sleeper, this notion of reconstruction connects back to Dewey's metaphysics. On his view, the metaphysics can be seen to function as a background theory to the theory of inquiry. Through it, experience is connected to nature, mind to body, thought to action, communication to the things of the world, and consequences to value. Awkward, imposed disjunctions or arbitrary separations between the world and our full physical and intellectual participation in it are gone. In the simplest terms, inquiry as a natural process gives us access to nature. We apply intelligence and reflection-which are seen as natural-as we inquire; and broadly, through inquiry, we gradually come to understand the structures of existence, such that we can offer adequate criticism on subjects of belief, conduct, and appreciation. The wholeness of this arrangement relies on Dewey's theory of communication, says Sleeper, which he argues connects the theory of inquiry to the metaphysics. On this view, language allows us to establish a relationship between things in experience and things in existence. 74 In other words, by bundling the people, things, and consequences of inquiry together as meanings, language also carries our ontological understandings forward. Language is the tool that allows us to progress from experience to an understanding of existence.
An Enrichment of Design Research
In recent years, Buchanan and others have drawn links between Dewey's theory of inquiry and design research.
75 Through Sleeper's investigation, the possible relevance of the theory is extended further. Specifically, the Deweyan framework he reveals-linking people, things, and consequences in relation to knowledge-points to the possibility of a strengthened epistemological narrative for research that incorporates design practice. Examining this framework in detail helps us to identify features that, taken collectively, begin to scaffold such a narrative. The first feature is Dewey's explicit naturalization of thought, ideas, meanings, and imagination, as supported by his theorization of a "biosociocultural continuity" in metaphysics. 76 In this view, thought, ideas, and meanings are not understood in opposition to nature but instead are of nature, arising in action. As such, the creativity of designers and other professionals is no longer an anomalous, extra-natural occurrence but a finely honed ability to move iteratively between problems and solutions in the real world; this creativity is the outcome of an experimentation with meanings in discourse and, equally, a necessary process at play within inquiry.
The second feature concerns Dewey's identification of two types of inquiry: everyday, common-sense inquiry and scientific inquiry. The two are distinguished in terms of their subject matter and priorities but not their basic logic or metaphysical standing. As such, they are seen as related along a continuum of investigation. A parallel can be drawn here between design practice and design research. 77 Both have specific aims and priorities (e.g., the development and delivery of products, services, and experiences of the former, and the production of knowledge of the latter), but they are not logically different. In each case, the inquirers-one a designer, the other a design researcher-move from indeterminacy to situations that are increasingly determined. From this perspective, incorporating design into a research project is unproblematic. Indeed, it might even be necessary or desirable.
The third feature is Dewey's concept of warranted assertibility. Here, the workable object of knowledge is valued for its applicability to future inquiries, as opposed to any supposed correspondence to an ultimate reality. The relevance of this feature for design research has been highlighted by several authors. 78 It is a particularly compelling concept because it suggests that competency, contextual appropriateness, and transferability can legitimately underscore an inquiry's conclusions. 79 The fourth feature in Sleeper's Deweyan framework is perhaps the most significant. It relates to his claim that Dewey sees inquiry as a process of ontological transformation. On this account, the inquirer works to convert unknown objects into known objects and thus reconstructs these entities, along with the wider network of relations they sustain. Design inquiries arguably go further in that novel things can be developed and deployed in social situations, leading to novel consequences. People, things, and consequences are then drawn together in new ways, resulting in new meanings and wholly new sets of relations. From this perspective, design inquiries transform not only the things encountered, but also the range of things, consequences, and meanings available for encounter.
This strategy has been widely explored in design research. For example, Dunne and Raby's critical design and Walker's development of propositional objects both can be seen to include the active interrogation of ontological themes as a function of inquiry. 80 In both cases, scenarios and artifacts are designed with the explicit aim of questioning assumptions and expanding possibilities. Other parallels can be found in the work of Krippendorff and Verganti, who both investigate design's relationship with meaning. For Krippendorff, design is a process that disrupts present stabilities; "meaning," he claims, is constituted in the use of its outcomes. 81 Similarly, Verganti argues that through "in-depth explorations of the evolution of society, culture, and technology," designers are capable of radically innovating product meanings. 82 Lining up the features in sequence, then, naturalized creative thought is linked to the conduct of design inquiry-in both its practical and academic forms-which in turn is linked to an understanding of knowledge as contingent and ontologically transformative. As a whole, this arrangement begins to offer an outline for an epistemological narrative about design research that draws it into an explicit relationship with design practice. Both share a basic logic and yet also retain a particular, specific set of aims and priorities-with design research focusing exclusively on knowledge production. Following Dewey's lead, we can recognize that as the unknown becomes known (and the unmade becomes made), the potential emerges to bring about a deep and profound reorientation of our ontological parameters. Further, the broader task of the design research community becomes the critical articulation of the extent to which particular appearances and consequences-as represented in its discourse relating people to things-contribute to the institution and perpetuation of "more enduring and extensive" values.
